Feminist approaches to sexuality and law scholarship by Auchmuty, Rosemary
Feminist approaches to sexuality and law 
scholarship 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Auchmuty, R. (2015) Feminist approaches to sexuality and law 
scholarship. Legal Information Management, 15 (1). pp. 4­7. 
ISSN 1472­6696 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1472669615000055 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/39421/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1472669615000055 
Publisher: Cambridge University Press 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
1 
 
FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SEXUALITY AND LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
Rosemary Auchmuty 
 
 
School of Law 
University of Reading 
Foxhill House 
Whiteknights Road 
Reading RG6 7BA 
 
Abstract 
Sexuality and Law scholarship is a new and developing field but, like most legal 
scholarship, it is dominated by masculine concerns and methodologies.  This article 
explains why research that ignores feminist concerns and methodologies will be 
incomplete and inaccurate, and suggests questions that should be asked of resources to 
ensure a complete and accurate coverage of the topic.   
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FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SEXUALITY AND LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
Rosemary Auchmuty 
The workshop at which this paper was presented was directed at doctoral and early 
career scholars in law.  My aim was to show how mainstream Sexuality and Law 
scholarship is dominated by masculine concerns and methodologies and to suggest how, 
using feminist approaches, scholarship might be more accurate and inclusive.  Feminism 
is a broad church, embracing many theoretical strands.  I would emphasise, however, 
that employing a feminist approach is not simply a choice of position among many 
others; it is an essential element in good scholarship.  Without the feminist considerations I 
am about to outline, the end product of the research will simply be incomplete.1   
Beyond theory 
A feminist approach is one that foregrounds gender.  Indeed, “feminist” is the adjective 
that is applied to scholarship about gender; gender would not have become an issue for 
scholarship or law if it had not been brought to their attention by feminists.  Feminist 
approaches remind us that the world is not composed solely of men; that women have 
different experiences from men; that the sexes exist in relation to each other, and that this is 
a relationship not simply of inequality but often of overt discrimination and oppression.  
The fact that there were no women in the UK legal professions until 1920, for example, 
was not because no woman wanted to practise as a lawyer before that date; it was 
because men used every possible means, legal and extra-legal, to keep them out 
(Auchmuty 2011).   
Feminist scholarship developed from second wave of feminism in the 1970s.  This 
is not to say that feminist critiques did not exist before then, rather that they were not 
regarded as serious research until feminists entered the academy in substantial numbers 
in the 1980s.  Feminism came late to law and, while now an accepted and growing field, 
it remains separate and marginal; it is still possible for law students to meet no feminist 
input throughout their entire degree programme.  Only this week I was shown a new 
textbook on Jurisprudence that gave no attention to either women or feminist 
jurisprudence in its entire 120,000 word length.2  The publisher seemed surprised when I 
expressed concern; while fully aware that women make up more than half our law 
students (and the market for his books), he had simply not noticed there was nothing in 
this book that applied specifically to women.3   
 Sexuality scholarship has developed over the same period through two quite 
separate theoretical strands, themselves gendered.  Gay liberation emerged after the 
legalisation of gay male sex in 1967.  But its focus on male concerns, such as the unequal 
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age of consent and restrictions on public sex, and its disregard for women’s concerns, such 
as custody of children, led to many women shifting their allegiance to the women’s 
movement in the early 1970s.  Lesbian feminism introduced sexuality into a movement 
hitherto perceived to represent only heterosexual women and socialist issues (Auchmuty 
2000: 783).  More recently, feminists in the academy have found allies among queer 
theorists, many of them men sympathetic to women’s concerns (e.g. Stychin 1995).  But 
large sections of the gay male population have remained untouched by feminism, so that 
much sexuality scholarship produced by men continues to ignore gender, while still 
using the universalist tone that purports to speak for everyone.4  
Beyond the male 
The classic problem that pervades all knowledge and all scholarship, such as the 
Jurisprudence text I mentioned above, is the simple absence of women in mainstream 
work; the use of universal words to describe the experience of one sex only; the 
continuing acceptability of accounts that focus solely on male concerns. When people 
hear or use the words “gay” and “homosexual”, it is men they see in their mind’s eye, men 
whose experiences they imagine or describe.  The consequence is not simply that 
lesbians become invisible, they become implicated in male gay practices (both sexual and 
social) which actually they are much less likely, and heterosexual men much more likely, 
to engage in.  Women form a tiny proportion of sexual abusers, lesbians even fewer, but 
that did not stop the courts from denying lesbian mothers custody of their own children 
for decades.  During the AIDS crisis, when lesbians (the least vulnerable group) rallied 
round to attack the culture of gay-bashing and help care for their ill gay friends, their 
own concerns were moved off the gay agenda as unimportant in the face of this life-
changing epidemic. 
 What is clear then is that lesbians are often situated in a very different place from 
gay men, just as heterosexual women are situated differently from heterosexual men.  It 
is not an essential difference; indeed, a central feature of feminism is that gender is 
socially constructed, and our goal is the abolition of gender, that is, the creation of a world 
in which one’s biological sex makes no social difference.  But, as long as gender does 
make a difference, the first question the scholar of sexuality and law must ask of her 
sources is: Is the situation different for men and for women?  Does this law apply equally 
and in the same way to men and women?  Who campaigned for it, and why?  Who 
benefits?  (Auchmuty 1997). 
 Answering these questions usually gives the lie to any assumption of identity of 
interests among lesbians and gay men.  Some examples: consensual sex between adult 
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men in private was illegal between 1885 and 1967.  So in one sense lesbians, who were 
outside this law, were less vulnerable to legal intervention and the danger of 
harassment, humiliation and blackmail.  But that is not to say that lesbians were 
unaffected: on the one hand, their absence from legal recognition rendered them silent 
and invisible for decades, yet, when prosecuted under other provisions such as sexual 
assault, they were subjected to excessive penalties, as is usually the case with female 
offenders (Derry 2007).  It is this last part that is usually ignored in accounts of Sexuality 
and Law, which may be unclear about whether “sodomy” laws actually applied to 
women as well as men or, alternatively, may assume that lesbians lived easy lives 
untouched by legal and social opprobrium. 
Even today, with criminalisation behind us, lesbians and gay men experience the 
law differently.  Take the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which allows same-sex couples to 
register their partnership and acquire more or less the same rights and responsibilities as 
heterosexual married couples.5  Largely campaigned for by men, often for financial 
reasons (inheritance tax featured prominently in the publicity), the civil partnership has 
proved less attractive for women – often, again, for financial reasons.  Men are more 
likely to have property they want to protect and pass on through inheritance and 
pensions.  Women are likely to be poorer, so these provisions are of no practical use to 
the majority, and may indeed be detrimental, as where benefits are calculated on a 
household basis.6  This law treats lesbians and gays equally, but lesbians as a group do not 
benefit from it in the same way as men as a group.   
So, the first principle is to “ask the woman question”, and do not assume an 
identity of interests between lesbians and gay men.  The truth is that lesbians have more 
in common with heterosexual women than with gay men, simply because of the 
gendered differences and inequalities that still dominate society.  That means, for library 
work, that searches should be made under “lesbian” as well as “gay” and “homosexual”; 
that work by women as well as men should be consulted; and that where the scholar 
finds that only the male experience appears to be described, this should be noted and 
problematised. 
Beyond the middle-class, white, coupled male 
The person envisaged in much of the recent civil partnership/same-sex marriage 
literature is the worthy male citizen, the employed or retired man long settled with a 
partner in a home they own.  He thinks it’s unfair he can’t get married like his 
heterosexual friends.  He thinks it’s unfair that if he or his partner dies, inheritance tax 
will be payable on his estate because their house is now worth three-quarters of a million 
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pounds.  He thinks it’s unfair that his life insurance policy costs more than a 
heterosexual man’s because gay men are associated with a higher risk of sexually 
transmitted disease.  So he campaigns for law reform, and he gets it: and now (mark my 
words) he will be focusing on gay men’s access to reproductive rights.  But, as Neil Cobb 
has written in an excellent article on this issue, the removal of the sexually transmitted 
disease presumption in insurance policies for gay men does nothing for those of African 
origin travelling to Africa who will still pay more because they, too, are presumed to be 
at greater risk of HIV/AIDS (Cobb 2010).  Likewise, civil partnerships and same-sex 
marriage, with their legal and social privileges, do nothing for uncoupled gays and 
lesbians, and single people generally.  And I predict that access to reproductive rights 
will be claimed by many gay men without thought for the exploitation of commercial 
surrogate mothers in third-world countries.7   
 It is important, then, to consider the situation of all gays and lesbians, and all 
people generally, not simply the relatively privileged campaigners for yet more 
privileges, who often seem to disregard those excluded from those privileges or actually 
made more vulnerable by the dominant group’s new access to “rights”.  The gay rights 
literature is dominated by this narrow, self-interested kind of scholarship.  Seeking out 
specifically feminist accounts, especially those that foreground class, is essential.8 
Beyond rights 
Notwithstanding their differences, the theoretical underpinnings of women’s liberation 
and gay liberation in the 1970s had one thing in common: an analysis of power.  The 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law in 1998 
led to a new legal consciousness conceived in terms of rights, leading in turn to the 
dominant discourse today of equality and diversity.  Thus the old political basis of both 
Gender and Sexuality and Law scholarship, which focused on the ways that dominant 
groups (heterosexuals, men) oppress subordinate groups (homosexuals, women), gave 
way to a liberal call for inclusion for some, but not all, individuals and groups.  A rights 
analysis of necessity categorises people into identity groups and, where women were 
once seen as a separate identity group from men, when sexuality became the defining 
characteristic gays and lesbians were grouped together and the gendered differences 
simply disappeared from attention.  These days, where people once spoke of the “lesbian 
and gay” community (Auchmuty, Jeffreys and Miller 1992), we see “LGBT” (lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender) and recently I saw “LGBTQI” (lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, queer and intersex) all lumped together as one “community”.  In truth, of 
course, each of these groups has separate and sometimes conflicting interests.  That is 
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not to say that lesbians might not sometimes choose to ally themselves politically with 
gay men, as they did in the campaign against section 28 of the Local Government Act 
1988 which prohibited the “promotion” of homosexuality by schools and local 
authorities.  But what generally happens when women work together with men is that 
the men’s voices dominate and their interests prevail.  In the anti-section 28 campaign, 
gay men argued that homosexuality could not be promoted, since homosexuals were 
born, not made.  The lesbian feminist analysis – that sexuality is socially constructed, not 
inborn – was drowned out, even though it reflected many women’s personal experience 
of moving from a heterosexual to a lesbian identity.  For these reasons, then, researchers 
should avoid the mindless conflation of lesbian, gay, transgender and the rest; they 
should be precise about who exactly is encompassed in any discussion and, where 
necessary, include the separate and different experiences and analyses of all groups.   
Beyond equality 
Current debates in Sexuality and Law are almost always conceptualised in terms of 
equality. There is nothing wrong with equality, but it misses the point for feminism, 
whose goal is not simply to be included in the status quo, but to transform it.  Historically, 
women have not simply been unequal to men, they have been oppressed by them and the 
institutions of patriarchy constructed to perpetuate male power.  Gays and lesbians, 
similarly, have not just been unequal to heterosexuals; they have been oppressed by 
them and the institutions of heterosexism and homophobia constructed to perpetuate 
the heteropatriarchy. 
 Equality has never been women’s first priority.  First-wave feminists in 
nineteenth-century Britain were not simply campaigning for equal rights to education, 
work, property, the vote, as they have far too often been characterised; they were 
fighting to remove the oppressive and unjust laws that gave men power to dominate, 
exploit and exclude them and to control their property and their bodies.  In other words, 
women needed to get men off their backs before they could even think of working towards 
equality (Auchmuty 2008).  Likewise, for all the gays and lesbians who have been able to 
come out and be fully accepted at home and at work and even to get married as a result 
of the huge liberal shifts in mainstream society in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, there are many others who still suffer not simply generalised inequality 
but ideological and familial pressures, social ostracism, violence and even death for their 
sexual choices.   
 So a Sexuality and Law analysis that stops short at rights and equality is an 
incomplete one.  First, in pressing for equality, we need to consider whether we really 
7 
 
want equality with dominant groups who for centuries have perpetuated their own 
power through oppressive practices such as those we now abhor in other parts of the 
world or “other” communities at home.  Second, we need to think about changing the 
world: challenging heterosexual power, shifting behaviour and attitudes and, as many 
feminists have argued, making heterosexuals more like us – more egalitarian, less 
gendered in their relationships, more inclusive in their communities.   
Beyond law 
Feminists are cautious about looking to law to tackle injustice.  The expectation that a 
change in the law will solve our difficulties is naïve and has proved disappointing for 
women time and time again.  Today, for example, we have very severe rape laws, but we 
still have a high rate of rape and a low rate of convictions.  Dominant structures have a 
way of negotiating legal barriers, reconfiguring debates and finding a way to return to 
the preferred status quo or something close.   
 What we need, much more than legal change, is attitudinal change; and, while the 
two are clearly linked – the change in public opinion towards gays and lesbians was in 
large part driven by the Civil Partnership Act 2004 – it is education that is the key to our 
liberation.  The more people know about law and sexuality and the more that rational 
argument is available to counter prejudice and religious dogma, the more individuals 
will be empowered to take control of their own lives and make sensible decisions 
without needing to look to law’s partial and inadequate protection.   
 Alongside education, we need to think in terms of politics.  Feminism is both an 
intellectual analysis and a politics, and Sexuality and Law scholars need to locate their 
research in the context of a rapidly changing society in which long-held values of 
compassion and solidarity are being removed one by one, to be replaced by ideology-
driven policies without evidential basis, whose goal will surely be, intentionally or not, 
the erosion of the equality and diversity we have worked so hard to achieve.  As Homa 
Khaleeli wrote in the Guardian on 28 October 2014, “Feminism is not just about wishing 
for women to have the same rights and opportunities as men: it is a movement created 
to ensure that it happens.” Sexuality and Law scholarship must go beyond the “me-too” 
equal-rights agenda to see connections and make alliances with other social movements 
and return to political struggle, not simply legal reform, to get the world we want.  For 
legal researchers, this means looking beyond the law shelves in the library to search the 
sociology, social history, political science and literature offerings for information about 
political movements, especially feminism, that have led and will lead to legal change. 
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1
 Feminist work in Sexuality and Law can be found scattered across most socio-legal journals, 
especially Feminist Legal Studies, and in edited collections such as Munro and Stychin 2007. 
2
 I will not shame it by naming the book or its publisher. 
3 For a small sample of feminist jurisprudence collections, just to show that this is not a new 
area, see Barnett 1996, Barnett 1998, Bowman et al 2010, Dowd and Jacobs 2006, Fineman et al 
2009, Levit and Verchik 2006, Olsen 1995, Richardson and Sandland 2000, Smith 1993.  
4
 Much of the literature civil partnership and same-sex marriage falls into this category. 
5
 The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 confers the same rights as civil partnership. 
6
 Prior to 2005 same-sex couples were treated as two individuals (thus attracting higher benefits) 
because their relationship was not recognised in law.  See Auchmuty 2007. 
7
 At the very workshop at which I presented this paper, a young male doctoral student asked me 
what the problem was for the women surrogates from third-world countries: ‘Isn’t it just a 
contract?’, he said.  Rights did not come into it, nor the risks of pregnancy and childbirth, nor 
even the unequal bargaining power of the respective parties. 
8
 For example, there are dozens of books by men (mostly American) on same-sex marriage, all 
presenting the same liberal arguments.  Researchers on this topic should be directed to Barker 
2012 for a feminist view. 
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